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IN MEMORIAM
HARVEY GOLDSCHMID: THE SCHOLAR
AS REALISTIC REFORMER
John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Harvey Goldschmid was a Renaissance Man--extraordinary teacher, farsighted public servant, skillful negotiator, and corporate statesman. But sometimes, less attention is given to his career as a legal scholar. Here too, however,
his work has had impact and will last. Let me focus briefly on two examples.
At the request of his Columbia colleague and American Law Institute
(ALI) Executive Director, Herbert Wechsler, Harvey Goldschmid drafted the
original memorandum that set in motion a major project by the ALI to codify
both the legal rules on fiduciary duties and the best practices in corporate
governance in a Restatement-like format. The eventual upshot of this effort was
a significant achievement for the ALI: Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations. But its gestation took over a decade of
controversy and hard work. Law reform, as Herbert Wechsler liked to say, was
"not for the short-winded." This delay was in part because the topic was complex and the world was changing, but more because many critics and opponents
sought to stop the project dead in its tracks. They knew that ALI Restatements
were influential, and they feared (correctly) that the ALI could not be lobbied
in the same backroom style as corporate lobbyists used in dealing with state
legislatures. Rather than objecting simply to the specifics of what the ALI's
Reporters proposed, these critics challenged the ALI's right to speak or address
topics that were not purely legal in nature. Business groups retained counsel,
and some ALI members took on the questionable dual roles of counsel to a
client and voting (and theoretically disinterested) ALI member.
As the Reporter for Litigation Remedies for this project, I had a ringside
seat and saw Harvey at his best and most stalwart. He became the Deputy Chief
Reporter (with Melvin Eisenberg of Berkeley handling the Chief Reporter's
duties). Harvey took for himself the critical role of drafting the standards for
the duty of care and the business judgment rule. At every step, his opponents
sought delay and argued that the complexity of the topic precluded any blackletter articulation of the rule. Characteristically, Harvey persisted (through
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Director of the Center on Corporate Governance,
Columbia University Law School.
1. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (Am. Law Inst.
1992).
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more drafts than I can now remember), and eventually the product of his
labors-section 4.01 of the Principles of Corporate Governance-was approved by the ALI and has become the most cited provision of the Principles.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the topic, section 4.01 is both admirably clear and subtle. It conditions the business judgment rule on a requirement
that the officer or director seeking to invoke it "is informed with respect to the
subject of the business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances. ' 2 There are nuances in
those words (as this is an objective standard coupled with a subjective requirement of good faith). It contains both a "standard of conduct" (i.e., a standard
telling the actor how to behave) and a "standard of appellate review" (a
standard telling courts how to enforce the rule). 3 Thus, it was at once aspirational, exhortative, and realistic. Although Professor Goldschmid was at points
forced to compromise, he did so only marginally and grudgingly.
In a similar effort to ensure that the costs of the rule did not exceed its
benefits, he and I agreed on a compromise strategy as to how it was to be
enforced. I had long believed that the historic role of the derivative action was
to enforce the duty of loyalty, not the duty of care. Duty-of-care cases could
often threaten astronomic damages and thus could create an excessive incentive
for plaintiffs to bring cases that might be weak on these merits. Also, corporate
actors might feel compelled to settle, regardless of the merits, in a way that
trivialized the operative legal standards. In my sections, we proposed (and the
ALI agreed) that shareholders could adopt a charter amendment severely reducing the damages for a breach of the duty of care (subject to various limitations). 4 Originally, this idea of charter-imposed limitations on liability seemed
novel, and many doubted that it would be followed. But then, in the wake of
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, a decision
that imposed significant damages on independent directors for breach of the
duty of care, 5 a crisis arose. Directors' and officers' insurance policies were
canceled, and some panicked outside directors actually resigned for fear of
liability. This crisis necessitated a response from Delaware, and a drafting committee, after considering a variety of options, turned to our charter amendment
proposal. Within months after our proposal was first published, Delaware
enacted a form of it (with some questionable modifications) as section

2. Id. § 4.01(c)(2).
3. For a fuller explanation of this distinction, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of
Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437
(1993).
4. See Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations at § 7.19
(providing limitations on damages for violations of duty of care).
5. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). Special exceptions were carved out for "knowing and
culpable violations of law," "conscious disregard" of duties where serious injury was threatened
to the corporation, and a continuing "abdication of duty." Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations at § 7.19. But the ceiling would clearly have applied to the facts
of Smith v. Van Gorkom.
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102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. 6 By 1987, a majority of
the states had followed, with at least some states adopting provisions more
closely modeled after the ALI version. 7 Within a few more years, the vast
majority of public corporations exercised their new power to adopt such a
charter provision, and institutional shareholders voted for them in overwhelming numbers. Rarely has an academic proposal received such near-universal
acceptance. In my judgment, this broad acceptance was because the integrated
ALI roposal gave the choice to shareholders and did not seek to outflank
them.
A second example that similarly shows Professor Goldschmid's ability to
reach a well-balanced compromise (while also withstanding overbearing pressure) is Regulation FD.10 This Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
rule, drafted under his supervision while he was the SEC's General Counsel,
prohibited selective disclosure without attempting to characterize it as insider
trading. In Dirks v. SEC, the Commission had suffered a stinging defeat, as the
Supreme Court had imposed a fiduciary breach requirement on the law of
insider trading." In its wake, investment banks developed a very lucrative
practice under which their securities analysts regularly tipped institutional
investors as to corporate earnings and other material developments, often just a
day (or even hours) before the public release of this same information.
Potentially, the SEC could have responded with a rule that deemed such
communications and trading to be unlawful insider trading (even though no
"personal benefit" was paid to the tippee, who may have believed such advance
disclosure was in the corporation's interests). But such a strategy would have
placed the SEC on a collision course with the Supreme Court and risked

6. The ALI proposal basically enabled shareholders to place a ceiling on director and officer
liability for duty of care breaches equal to such person's annual compensation from the corporation. This was intended to permit plaintiffs to recover more from the CEO and other "inside"
directors (who might receive millions in salary and options), while only a modest amount from
outside directors. The rationale was that CEOs were unlikely to be deterred from serving by the
threat of some liability, while outside directors might be. Although Delaware adopted the ALI
charter provision approach, it authorized a charter provision that simply eliminated monetary
liability for breach of the duty of care (absent some special exceptions, such as knowing
illegality). Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
7. Some thirty-one states adopted legislation eliminating or placing a ceiling on duty of care
liability between 1985 and 1987. See ALl, supra note 1, § 7.19 reporter's note 4, Virginia
followed the ALl approach by placing a ceiling on such liability, which ceiling looked in part to
the annual compensation received from the corporation. See Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-692.1 (2015).
8. The only ALl proposals that I can recall receiving greater support would be the ALI's
Model Penal Code (drafted by Professor Wechsler).
9. Delaware had been considering the alternative of authorizing corporate indemnification of
the recovery (judgment or settlement) in a duty of care action. But that approach had a number of
faults, including that it might encourage the bringing of more such duty of care actions in the
hopes of passing the costs of settlement on to the corporation (and its shareholders).
10. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-103 (2015). This rule was adopted in 2000. See Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§
243.100-103).
11. 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
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reversal. Wisely, Harvey Goldschmid fashioned a compromise solution: a nonfraud rule that made selective disclosure effectively a venial sin. Probably no
SEC rule in the modem era was more vehemently resisted by the industry (or
more fervently supported by ordinary investors). Now, fifteen years later, one
must conclude that his compromise worked: Selective disclosure is no longer
an institutionalized practice (and the market remains efficient). The rule was
also part of an integrated package of insider-trading reforms that in some cases
expanded liability and in other cases created a safe harbor that allowed
corporate officials to arrange their affairs so that they could avoid any risk of
involvement in insider trading. 12 To a considerable degree, Professor
Goldschmid thus shaped the modem law on insider trading.
Both these examples reveal Harvey Goldschmid's character, personality,
and essential toughness. He fought fiercely contested battles and won against
entrenched forces that rejected any reform. But his courage was tempered by
realism and good judgment. Never reckless, he triumphed because he could
marshal convincing support for an always reasonable position. That is how he
should be remembered-tough, smart, willing to structure a balanced compromise, but committed to fairness.

12. At the same time as the SEC adopted Regulation FD, the SEC also adopted Rules lOb5I and I0b5-2. The latter rule expanded liability, effectively reversing United States v. Chestman,
947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2, while Rule lob5-1 gave executives a
safe harbor by which they could avoid any risk of liability if they gave full investment discretion
to another person to trade for them. See id. § 240. l Ob5-1.

